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All public infrastructure projects, irrespective of how they are procured,
managed and financed, generate future liabilities. This becomes even more
apparent under the Public Private Partnership arrangement. A number of
these liabilities are subject to a high degree of uncertainty regarding when
they will arise and the financial exposure involved when they do, and are
therefore said to be contingent. Contingent liabilities have the potential to
undermine national macroeconomic policy and cause significant economic
harm when they crystalize. This article examines the legal and institutional
mechanisms available in Nigeria to manage these liabilities and suggests
ways for designing a PPP delivery process with inbuilt mechanisms for
identifying, mitigating, tracking, and managing them.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are difficult to define. One of the
principal reasons for this is that the concept is constantly evolving in
various ways, in different sectors and different countries. Therefore,
characteristics or boundaries of transactions or projects that may
constitute PPPs are not closed; new PPP arrangements are constantly
emerging. In recognition of this fact, the European Commission
observed that PPP, as a concept, is still evolving and has divergent
arrangements that may be adapted to suit the requirement of projects
and project partners on a pragmatic basis.1 Also, the concept is amenable
* MBA (Oxford), PhD in Law (University of Hull), Former PPP Adviser, Federal
Ministry of Finance, Government of Nigeria. Email: gnwangwu@gmail.com
1 EC Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships (2003) <http://
ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/ docgener/guides/ppp_en.pdf> accessed
17 September 2010.
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to different uses. For instance, it has been employed variously as a
governance or management tool,2 as a development strategy3 or as a
discursive term or language game.4 It has also been at the centre of
political debate, allowing different parties the opportunity to use it in
a manner that provides them with political leverage.5
Nevertheless, we may attempt a working definition that suits the
topic of this article. PPPs may be defined as long-term relationships
between public sector agencies and private sector entities under which
the responsibility for any or all of the combination of designing,
financing, construction, management and operation of public
infrastructure and utilities that were traditionally undertaken by the
public sector are contractually shared and jointly undertaken by both
the public and private sector, usually in proportion to the kind of risks
each party can best carry.6 This definition captures the essential elements
of infrastructure PPPs, which is where PPPs are used to attract private
sector finance for use in procuring public infrastructure. It might also
be worth mentioning at this juncture that for this work, a transaction
only qualifies as a PPP if there is a significant and optimal transfer of
project risks between the public and private sectors.
All public infrastructure projects, irrespective of how they are
procured, managed and financed, generate future liabilities. However,
2 This notion recognizes that PPP provides a novel approach to delivering goods
and services to citizens and focuses on the organizational aspects of the
relationship especially the cooperation between the private and public sectors.
See GA Hodge and C Greve, “Public-Private Partnerships: An International
Performance Review” (2007) Public Administration Review, May/June 545-58
3 This notion argues that PPP maximizes the benefits of development through
collaboration and enhanced development. See, for example, the definition by
the World Bank below.
4 As a language game it is assumed that PPP is used to cloud other strategies or
purposes. For example, since privatization is a very contentious term, that a
more acceptable term like PPP can be used to cloud the real intentions of the
person employing the term. Generally, see NA Khanom, “Conceptual Issues in
Defining Public Private Partnerships (PPP)” (2010) 6(2) International Review of
Business Research 150-163; G. A. Hodge and C. Greve, “Public-Private
Partnerships: An International Performance Review” supra for an analysis of
the different approaches.
5  The Blair Government in the United Kingdom.
6 G. Nwangwu, “The Legal Framework for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) In
Nigeria: Untangling the Complex Web”, (2012) 7(4) EPPPL 268-277.
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this becomes even more apparent under PPPs.7 A number of these
liabilities are subject to a high degree of uncertainty, both as to when
and if they will arise and as to the financial exposure involved when
they do; hence they are said to be contingent. Contingent liabilities
have the potential to undermine national macroeconomic policy and
to cause significant economic harm when they crystalize. This article
examines the legal and institutional mechanisms available within
Nigeria for the management of these liabilities and suggests ways for
designing a PPP delivery process with inbuilt mechanisms for
identifying, mitigating, tracking, and managing them.
The article is organized into five sections. After this introduction,
section 2 discusses the history and growth of PPPs in Nigeria. Section
3 evaluates the key legal and investment risks associated with PPP
projects. Section 4 discusses practical approaches for managing and
addressing contingent risks in PPPs in Nigeria. Section 5 is the
conclusion.
2.  THE GROWTH OF PPPS IN NIGERIA
Even though Nigeria has one of the biggest economies in Africa, the
country’s infrastructure is in really bad shape. The power sector in the
country is marked by low-generating capacity relative to installed
capacity. For instance, electricity generation ranges between 2,500
megawatts to about 4,000MW while estimated national consumption
is in excess of 10,000 megawatts.8 It is estimated that the country
currently spends US$13 billion in fueling power generators to cover
the deficit in power needs9 and it is estimated that demand will double
in the next few years.10 The state of the country’s road network is poor
with only about 15.3 per cent of its 195,200 kilometres paved and
7 See Vincent Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-
Private Partnerships in Nigeria” (2013) 2 (1) Afe Babalola University: Journal
of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 206-221.
8 MO Yusuf, Private Sector Initiatives and Infrastructural Development in Nigeria
(2004) <http://www.cenbank.org/out/Publications/occasionalpapers/rd/
2004/Jos-02-4.pdf> accessed 28 February, 2012.
9 NG Ekanem, “Nigeria the Most Dynamic PPP Market in Africa?” (2010) A
Paper presented at the SADC PPP Forum and Network Launch in Midrand,
South Africa, February 2010.
10 Ibid.
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about 28 per cent of these bad and un-motorable.11 The situation with
the railway infrastructure is worse; the entire network is virtually
moribund and outdated due to lack of upgrade and maintenance for
over two decades.12 In many urban areas, hospitals, water supply,
sewerage and waste disposal infrastructure, to mention a few, are
virtually non-existent. Maintenance of the partially existing ones has
been poor.
All these are being compounded by the twin problems of rapid
population growth and urbanization. The investment required to meet
the Government’s Vision 2020 target is estimated at US$35 billion for
the power sector, US$13b for the railways, US$5billion for the ports
and US$3.5 billion for the roads.13 It is a fact that the government is
virtually unable to raise these large sums of monies required to meet
this target. Consequently, it has set for itself a very ambitious target of
attracting very huge private sector finance to meet these obligations.
Therefore, a number of policies and regulations have been introduced
in recent years to help actualize this objective. In furtherance of this,
the country recently launched the National Integrated Infrastructure
Master Plan (NIIMP) and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan,
which prioritized the provision of infrastructure and charts a new course
for the delivery of infrastructure within the country.
This is not going to be an easy task because it is estimated that the
country needs to invest between US$6billion and US$9billion every
year for the next eight years to meet its infrastructure requirements.14
This is an enormous amount of money required within a very short
time frame. It follows therefore that the primary motivation for the
use of PPPs in Nigeria is to bridge the funding gap between funds
available to government and the large amount of funds that is actually
11 U. Ohia, “Infrastructure Concessions in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities”
(2011) A paper presented at the 5th Annual Diaspora Conference held in
Abuja on 25-27 July 2011.
12 Recently the Abuja-Kaduna Railway line was commissioned and became about
the only functional railway line in the country.
13 M. Ahmed, “Infrastructure Development for Nigeria: The PPP Imperative”
(2011) <http://www.icrc.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/PPP-Forum-
ICRC-DG-presentation-v4.pdf> accessed 28 February 2012.
14 M. A. Animashaun, “Public Private Partnership as a Strategy of Infrastructure
Finance in Nigeria” (2011) <http://njpg.pactu.edu.np/njpgfiles/4-
animashaun-mojeed-adekunle-public-private-partnership-as-a-policy-strategy-
of-infrastructure-financing-in-nigeria.html> accessed 28 February 2012.
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required to improve the country’s derelict infrastructure. The other
related factor is the failure and/or inefficiency of public authorities to
provide much-needed public services. The government hopes that the
private sector would be more efficient in providing these services.
The decision to resort to PPP was made easier by the fact that the
country had gone through a privatization programme that lasted over
three decades, which included a reform component encompassing the
liberalization and deregulation of the economy.15 In essence, there was
a partially liberalized economic environment in place; PPP was thus
seen as the natural progression from privatization. Also, PPP did not
carry “the baggage” which burdened the privatization programme
simply because it did not lead to the complete transfer of ownership of
assets from the government to the private sector (usually from overseas)
and so people seemed more comfortable with it.
Nigeria being a developing country, with a moderate capital budget,
an undeveloped capital market and not very buoyant private sector,
had to rely on foreign private sector funding to realize its goals of
providing infrastructure for its citizens. It is not surprising, therefore,
that most of the early investment in infrastructure via PPP came through
a collaboration between foreign investors and Nigerian businesses.
The multilateral financial agencies also came in with a lot of support
and finance. Some of the transactions that have been consummated so
far are mainly in the transport sector, including a new airport terminal
in Lagos, a new toll road in the Lekki area of Lagos, the seaports located
around Lagos and the Niger Delta region of the country. There are a
number of other projects currently in the pipeline like the light rail
project for the Federal Capital Territory and Lagos and the concession
of major road networks around the country.16
There is also a muted suggestion that the existing railway network
will also be concessioned. In other sectors like housing, the Federal
Capital Administration has concluded plans to concession the provision
of infrastructure in certain areas of the capital city to some investors,
and there are also ongoing deals being negotiated in the power sector.17
15 This programme was pursed through the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE).
Under the programme, over 200 transactions were concluded.
16 NG Ekanem supra.
17 Most of the hitherto government-owned power assets are being completely
divested through privatization. The only assets to be concessioned are the
hydro power plants.
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Joint Ventures and Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) arrangements
appear to be the most common PPP delivery mechanisms used in
infrastructure projects in Nigeria, however, other popular PPP
arrangements are Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT) and Design
Build Finance Operate (DBFO). There have also been a number of
concessions.18
It is clear therefore from the preceding that Nigeria has fully
embraced the use of PPPs to finance infrastructure. The problem with
this, however, is that investors require far more assurances to encourage
them to participate in projects within the country. This has been a
strong hindrance because investors (foreign and local) are wary of tying
down their capital for 25-30 years without sufficient guarantees that
they would be able to recoup their investments and make some profit.
It does not also help that the risk of doing business in Nigeria is higher
than in the more established economies. Therefore, prospective
investors would like to see evidence or assurances that their investments
will be safe and yield profitable returns. This has led to an increase in
the use of sovereign guarantees and therefore the concomitant rise in
contingent liabilities.
3.  LEGAL AND INVESTMENT RISKS IN PPPS
One of the major advantages of PPP over other procurement models is
the greater transfer of risks from the public sector to the private sector.19
It is important to note however that risk transfer does not eliminate
the risk; it only reduces their economic cost when properly allocated
to the appropriate party.20 Also, in reality, it is not feasible or wise to
transfer all the risks that may arise in a project to the private sector.
The essence of the “partnership” in PPP is the fact that parties are able
to share the risks and rewards so that the party best able to assume a
18 The 26 Ports in the country were concessioned through the use of the “landlord
tenant” model.
19 D. Grimsey and M. K. Lewis, “Evaluating the Risks for Public Private Partnerships
for Infrastructure Projects” (2002) 20 International Journal of Project
Management 107-118.
20 R. Marques and S. Berg, “Risks, Contracts and Private Sector Participation in
Infrastructure” (2011) 137 (11) Journal of Construction Engineering and
Management 925-932.
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particular risk shoulders it.21 Transferring all the risks to the private
sector would greatly impair the viability of the project and also most
likely its sustainability. This could lead to either the abandonment of
the project by the private sector, or an escalation of the project cost
thereby reducing its economic viability as, typically, the private sector
will cost every risk allotted to it and charge a premium for them.
Consequently, one may conclude that there is a correlation between
the proper transfer and management of risk and the improvement of
value for money on projects. The reason for this is simply because
parties now become more conscious of transferred risks and are able
to reduce either the probability of the risk occurring or the financial
consequences if it does or both.22 Accordingly, it is important that every
PPP project strives towards the proper allocation of risk between the
public and private sectors.
The allocation of risk is done first of all on the basis that the party
best able to assume a particular risk should bear it. Parties are best
suited to bear a risk where the economic and social cost of bearing the
risk is lower or where it would be easier or cheaper for one party to
mitigate the particular risk, thereby lowering its economic and social
cost. For instance, the private sector may choose to mitigate a number
of its contractually assumed risks by buying insurance to cover them
or by passing them down to other parties via subcontracts. Those risks
that cannot be insured against or transferred through the use of
subcontracts are inevitably dealt with through the use of special clauses
in the contract to mitigate their impact. There are however cases where
even after the risks have been apportioned to the private party; it may
make social, political and sometimes commercial sense for the public
sector to reduce the weight of the incidence of the risks that had been
allocated to the private sector by taking some elements of those risks
back. The reason for this is usually because the option of making the
mitigation of these risks solely the responsibility of the private sector
is more likely to increase the cost of the project. For instance, the cost
of insurance can be very high or, in some cases, not even available for
the particular risk. Also, from a public sector point of view, it may be
important to mitigate risk in order to stimulate the private sector to
21 See Vincent Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-
Private Partnerships in Nigeria” (2013) 2 (1) Afe Babalola University: Journal
of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 206-221.
22 Ibid.
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invest in projects, which it would not otherwise have considered for
investment. Another reason may be to reduce costs to the private sector
and consequently reduce tariffs and other burdens on its citizens.
It is important to note that it is this process of taking back some of
the risks or the reduction of the incidence of these risks by the public
sector that increases the potential for contingent liabilities arising in
projects for the government.
3.1 What are Contingent Liabilities?
All public infrastructure projects, irrespective of how they are procured,
managed and financed, generate future liabilities.23 Some of these, such
as the cost of repaying loans denominated in the domestic currency or
the costs of operating and maintaining an asset, are direct and
predictable with a relatively high level of certainty. Others such as the
cost of managing the consequences of an environmental incident related
to an asset, addressing the effects of technological obsolescence and
the crystallization of a sovereign guarantee, are subject to a high degree
of uncertainty both in relation to when and if they will arise, as well as
the financial exposure involved when they do. This is the reason why
these latter types of liabilities are said to be contingent.
A contingent liability is a “future” obligation that may or may not
arise. It depends on the outcome of an uncertain future event such as
the eventuation of a risk, the judgment of a court, credit default,
contractual warranty or contract default. Two types of contingent
liabilities are recognized: Explicit liabilities, which are usually based
on contractual agreements between the government and another party,
for example a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) or a contract to
guarantee project design and implicit liabilities, which are based on a
moral or political obligation to give governmental financial support
when needed; for example, where the government invokes its step-in
rights.
3.2 PPPs and Contingent Liabilities
It is a fact that contingent liabilities for government are more likely to
arise in the case of PPPs than under traditional procurement for some
23 See Vincent Tolani, “An Examination of Risk Allocation Preferences in Public-
Private Partnerships in Nigeria” (2013) 2 (1) Afe Babalola University: Journal
of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 206-221.
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reasons, including:
a. The greater complexity and range of the contractual framework
that applies in the case of PPPs than under traditional
procurement;
b. The fact that the manner in which PPPs are structured, and
the way that risks are allocated between the parties and the
possibility of mitigating these risks through the use of
guarantee instruments to incentivize investment by the private
sector party are likely to increase the probability of contingent
liabilities materializing;
c. The possibility that the public sector party in a PPP
arrangement may fail to identify, document, track and monitor
the full scale of the potential future liabilities associated with
the projects;
d. The fact that due to the nature of the social services that PPPs
provide, government retains an implicit obligation to bear
the costs of stepping in to provide the contracted services if
the private sector service provider fails. This is the case even
where there is no explicit contractual commitment to do so.
Therefore, due to the social nature of PPP projects and the way
they are structured, it means that governments would have to intervene
from time to time. However, when governments intervene, their actions
inevitably create liabilities. While some of these liabilities on the face
of it appear to be only explicit, they also generate a degree of contingent
liabilities. Some of government activities that generate contingent
liabilities are public loans, loan guarantees, equity participation,
subsidies, sovereign guarantees, and tax incentives. Others are viability
gap funding, protection from competition, grants, and annual operating
subsidies.
3.2.1  Public Loans
Under PPPs, the government may offer the private sector loans at very
low or no interest rates at all. This is intended to lower the project
cost. The loans may come as subordinated loans that supplement senior
loans obtained from commercial banks to enhance the financial terms
of the project. Also, the loans may be structured in a way that the
private sector only becomes entitled to it if certain project risks
materialize. In essence, the differential cost between these public loans
and the cost of commercial loans are borne by government. The
76 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 9: 2: 2018
economic cost of these types of loans become more apparent where it
is denominated in foreign currencies. In most cases, the liability arising
from this loan is quantifiable and direct. However, government has an
obligation to step in and repay the loan where the private sector defaults
on its obligation to pay back either because of project failure,
bankruptcy or delinquency. In these cases, government’s obligation
may now include repayment of the portion left unpaid by the private
sector party.
3.2.2  Loan Guarantees
The public sector may decide to guarantee the loans of the private
sector. This has the effect of lowering interest rates as the public sector
technically borrows at a cheaper rate than the private sector. Since the
government is a secondary obligor, its liability is contingent and only
crystalizes in the event of the private sector party’s default.
3.2.3  Equity Participation
Direct or indirect equity participation of the government in the projected
company helps improve the project liquidity and has two advantages.
The first is that it strengthens the assurance of the public and other
stakeholders about the project and helps the project achieve better
equity/debt gearing. In some cases, the public sector’s right to dividend
is subordinated to that of the private sector. Like all ordinary
shareholders in the project, the equity contribution is at risk and is
likely to be lost if the project fails. Note that there are also times where
ordinary shareholders may become liable for the SPV liabilities outside
of their investments in the business. This may occur where the
corporate veil is pierced24 or where the shareholders have given personal
or parent company guarantees to secure loans.
3.2.4  Subsidies
Where the actual cost of providing the service by the private sector is
too high and likely to affect the demand for the service, the government
24 The corporations enjoy separate corporate personalities, and this is well
entrenched in most common law jurisdictions. However, it is trite law that in
deserving cases, the courts will pierce the corporate veil to hold shareholders
labile for the actions of the company.
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may pay tariff subsidies to the private sector. The payment may be
structured in such a way that it becomes payable only where income
generated by the private sector falls below a certain minimum level.
An alternative way of doing this is to allow the private sector cross-
subsidize a less profitable service, activity or route with profitable ones.
It is difficult to estimate with certainty the full economic costs of these
subsidies and therefore the likelihood that it might spiral out of control
is high.
3.2.5  Sovereign Guarantees
The government may guarantee the proper behaviour and/or respect
of the commitments or obligations entered into by the public sector.
The failure of the public sector to respect such commitments or
obligations will give rise to a requirement to pay monetary compensa-
tion to the private sector. Also, sovereign guarantees may come in the
form of “off-take guarantee” where the public sector guarantees that it
will buy an agreed quantity of the service or product provided by the
private sector. This is usual in power purchase agreements where the
government or the off-taker agrees to pay capacity payments. It may
also come in the form of traffic guarantee contracts. This involves
guaranteeing either the traffic or revenue levels in the contract. The
failure to reach this minimum levels triggers compensation from the
public sector. In whatever form sovereign guarantees come, a contingent
liability is created immediately it is given in a project as the occurrence
of the guaranteed risk will trigger payment by the government.
3.2.6  Tax Incentives
The government may decide to give tax exemptions, tax holidays, rate
reductions, tax abatements or tax credits in other to incentivize the
private sector to go into certain businesses that it would not ordinarily
have gone into. The exemptions may also extend to duty waivers,
pioneer status, and so on. What this does is that it provides a cash
flow cushion for the investor, which makes the project numbers work
better. These tax incentives can be directed at specific financial aspects
of the project. The problem with tax incentives in a country like Nigeria
that operates a federal system of government is that there is likely to
be conflicts between the national, states and local authorities who
also have autonomy to tax within their respective jurisdictions. From
a contingent liability perspective, the elimination or reduction of taxes
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payable by private sector parties has the effect of depriving the
government of revenues, which it would have deployed for other uses.
Where a blanket tax holiday is provided for a particular sector, it
catalyses investments in that sector, attracting investments that would
have otherwise been diverted into other businesses that are subject to
full taxation. This may have a negative effect on government revenues
at least in the short term until the previously tax-exempt sector becomes
taxable.
3.2.7  Viability Gap Funding
This is a capital subsidy provided by the government to make projects
financially viable, which would otherwise not be viable if left alone to
the private sector to finance exclusively. For instance the Government
of India has a scheme whereby the viability gap in PPP infrastructure
projects is supported up to the tune of 20 per cent of the cost of the
project and the state government or its agencies that own the project
are also allowed to contribute an additional grant out of its own budget
not exceeding a further 20 per cent of the cost of the project.25 Again,
in very rare cases where a blanket viability gap is promised, it is likely
to create contingent liabilities.
3.2.8  Protection from Competition
This comes in the form of an assurance given by the government to the
private sector investor that it would not develop any competing
infrastructure within a given period within a distance of the private
sector’s project. For instance, in a toll road project, the government
may undertake not to build an alternative road that will compete or
undercut the revenues of the private sector. Given the long-term nature
of PPP agreements and the likelihood of constant population growth,
this may be capable of stifling infrastructure growth and is very
uncompetitive in nature. This is also likely to create contingent
liabilities if government is compelled to grant the private sector
beneficiary of this concession the first right of refusal to building
additional infrastructure within the restricted areas. The loss of revenues
and opportunities are unquantifiable.
25 Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board “Public Private Partnership” <http:/
/www.gidb.org/cms.aspx?content_id=96> accessed 30 March, 2012).
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3.2.9  Grants
Government may simply provide grants to the private sector investor
or, in some cases, government grants may be combined with the
payment mechanism to cover some of the capital cost. This may allow
the required user charge to be kept at a level that is affordable to end-
users. It may also be useful if the total project-funding requirement is
larger than the market appetite for funding projects of such nature.
This process has been used in light rail projects in the United Kingdom
and the Gautrain project in South Africa. Such payments may also be
performance linked.
3.2.10  Annual Operating Subsidies
This is an annual payment made by the public sector to a private sector
operator where the revenues generated by the project is insufficient to
give the private sector an acceptable return on its investment. Typically,
project revenues are disbursed on the basis of an agreed “waterfall”
model. Typically, operational expenses and loan repayments are given
preference before any payments are made to equity investors. In cases
where government offers annual operating subsidies, equity investors
are promised payments to guarantee them an acceptable return on
investment. In some cases, the payments are restricted to guarantee
the repayment of debt holders and no more. The difference between
operating subsidies and capital grants is that the use of subsidies may
increase overall project costs since the project SPV has to fund the
entire project cost.
4.  LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
FOR MANAGING CONTINGENT LIABILITIES
The principal institution that is charged with the responsibility for
managing contingent liabilities in PPP projects in Nigeria is the Debt
Management Office (DMO).26 Other institutions like the Ministry of
Finance and the budget office also play a role. The National Policy on
PPPs recognizes this fact when it provides:
26 Nigeria National Policy on Public-Private Partnership (2017) p 9 <https://
ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/library/nigeria-national-policy-
on-public-private-partnerships> accessed 12 August 2018.
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Together with the Ministry of Finance, the DMO will need to be
satisfied that any contingent liabilities are manageable within
Government’s economic and fiscal forecasts. The DMO will need
to be consulted in advance of project teams within an MDA which
is considering the involvement of multilateral agencies such as
IFC, MIGA or IDA in providing guarantees or other financial
instruments.27
The DMO itself is established by the Debt Management Act28 to
prepare and implement a plan for the efficient management of Nigeria’s
external and domestic debt obligations and set guidelines for managing
the country’s risk and currency exposure with respect to all loans.29
PPP transactions will obviously require the Government of Nigeria to
borrow both externally and internally as well as issue guarantees.
Therefore, the DMO will necessarily be involved. Indeed, the Debt
Management Act provides that the DMO shall “prepare a schedule of
any other Federal Government obligations such as trade debts and
other contingent liabilities both explicit or implicit and provide advice
on policies and procedures for their management.”30
The authority of the Ministry of Finance to be involved in the
management of contingent liabilities is the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
S. 47(1) of the Act gives power to the Minister of Finance, with the
approval of the Federal Executive Council (FEC), to grant guarantees
on behalf of the Government of the Federation. However, in doing this
S. 47(2) provides that “any guarantee granted by the Minister shall be
conditional upon the provision of a counter-guarantee equal to or higher
than the guarantee obligation, provided that there are no overdue
obligations from the requesting Government in the Federation to the
guarantor and its controlled corporations.
It follows, therefore, that the Minister of Finance may only grant
an application for a guarantee or other instrument that is likely to
create a contingent liability after the approval of the FEC. However,
the Minister must rely on the advice of the DMO in deciding on whether
or not to grant such instruments. To enable it to provide such advice
to the Minister of Finance in PPP projects, the DMO must conduct an
27 Ibid.
28 Debt Management Office (Establishment, etc.) Act No 18 of 2003.
29  ibid s 4.
30 Debt Management Act, s 6(1) (j).
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analysis of the project documents to identify, mitigate, and manage
the contingent liabilities. The PPP Division of the Federal Ministry of
Finance is also charged with the responsibility of identifying and
tracking contingent liabilities arising from PPP projects.
In managing contingent liabilities, the aim of the DMO and the
Ministry of Finance is not to drive out all contingent liabilities associated
with PPPs, but to minimize them. This is because guarantees and
contractual mechanisms that place appropriate risks with government
are vital instruments in enabling private participation to make the
maximum possible contribution to national infrastructure development.
The aim of the extant framework is to ensure that government’s fiscal
exposures to contingent liabilities from PPPs are properly understood
and only allowed where it makes a significant and proportionate
contribution to national development. The framework also seeks to
ensure that the aggregate contingent liabilities are kept within
manageable limits.
The first step in managing contingent liabilities is to ensure the
proper management of project risks. Given that the PPP contract is
used to allocate project risks, it should be drawn up in such a way that
it takes into consideration all eventualities that may affect the risk
profile of the parties. Contracts that fail to address risk comprehensively
are likely to raise the cost of infrastructure services to the final
consumers.31 On a policy level, it can be useful to provide for risk
allocation and mitigation guidelines in policy and legislative
instruments. This will guide the parties through the contract negotiation
process in the allocation, mitigation and pricing process before reducing
them into contractual clauses as either, for instance, conditions or
warranties or other contractual terms. There is also sometimes a need
for the standardization of PPP contracts by creating templates as it
may contribute towards greater transparency and reduce the incidence
of corruption. However, such standardization may lead to a greater
deal of rigidity in the PPP process.
 It is also recommended that Nigeria introduce procedures and
processes for managing and monitoring contingent liabilities from PPPs.
Project planners and developers must consider the budgetary
consequences of contingent liabilities compared with other funding
31 R. Marques and S. Berg Risks, “Contracts and Private Sector Participation in
Infrastructure” (supra).
82 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 9: 2: 2018
options available for the project. The government must also consider
the development of a contingent liability policy of guideline. A
contingent liability policy not only provides for a structured method of
dealing with contingent liabilities but may also have a positive influence
on the ability of the government to attract more foreign direct
investment to the country. It is essential that a key part of managing
contingent liabilities is having a consistent method for allocating funds
to projects and for verifying the need for government involvement.
Currently, there exists a lacuna in the coordinated management of
contingent liabilities. There is no comprehensive database from which
all indemnities, guarantees, and liabilities are managed. The government
needs to develop a model to check the premiums charged for liabilities
and calculating the capital required to offset them. Similarly, it is
necessary for a comprehensive model to examine the balance sheet of
the government’s safety nets for public-private partnership projects
(government exposure to the cash flow expected from the project),
and a regular evaluation of risks that are derived from the probability
that indemnities and guarantees granted by the government will be
realized.
In considering explicit contingent liabilities, it is important to verify
the need for government intervention, using a cost-benefit analysis,
before granting an option for a “bailout”. If government aid is required,
steps should be taken to determine whether a contingent liability is
the most efficient way to solve the problem. The duration of government
intervention should be based on whether the cause for the intervention
is temporary or permanent. For this reason, government officials should
consider defining the liabilities in an explicit contract and assess the
benefits and costs of such a move.
Where the government decides to provide any form of guarantee,
such guarantee must be provided with absolute care because if it is
misused, the public sector may be inadvertently creating a guarantee
culture where the private sector seeks guarantees as an alternative to
managing the risk itself.32 The use of guarantees may mean that the
risk previously assumed by the private sector reverts back to the public
sector.33 There is also the possibility that the cost and risk of such
32 United Nations Guide Book supra.
33 A. B. Alonso-Conde et al, “Public Private Partnerships: Incentives, Risk Transfer
and Real Options” (2007) 16(4) Review of Financial Economics 335-349.
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guarantees are neither transparent nor well understood by the PPP
stakeholders.34 It is also good practice to ensure that where these
guarantees are used, provision should be made for the use of claw-
back clauses. These clauses ensure that the private sector gets only the
benefits they need to make the project work and ensures that excess
benefits are creamed off and given back to the taxpayers. The reasoning
behind this is simply the notion that if risks are to be shared, then
benefits should also be shared.35
Also, when the construction phase of the project is completed,
and the private sector begins the operation of the services, the public
sector must put in place a risk monitoring and reporting system to
ensure that the services are delivered to the public according to the
contracted performance specifications.36 This will ensure that parties
continue to assume allocated risks and, therefore, guarantee the
continued viability of the project.
5.  CONCLUSION
PPPs can play important roles in accelerating the development of
infrastructure projects in developing countries. However, if not carefully
designed and implemented, PPPs can occasion significant contingent
liabilities. A number of these liabilities are subject to a high degree of
uncertainty, both as to when and if they will arise and as to the financial
exposure involved when they do.
In admitting projects with potential contingent liabilities, extreme
care ought to be taken, as experience from other countries has
demonstrated that the scale of total contingent liabilities can build up
quickly if a successful PPP programme is established and that economic
downturns or financial crises can result in fiscal liabilities from many
projects crystallizing together within a short period of time. This has
the potential to undermine national macroeconomic policy and to cause
significant economic harm. This is why the PPP delivery process must




36 United Nations Guidebook supra.
